Public health is intimately related to social justice, which is why practice and research in the field seek to improve the social determinants of health. Despite the best intentions of those working in public health, however, some policies and practices inadvertently further disadvantage pre-existing marginalized populations. In this paper, we provide a diagnosis of possible reasons why this phenomenon might occur. We posit that the challenges associated with further marginalizing certain populations stem from a) not acknowledging the normative aspects of apparently objective data, b) a misunderstanding and an uncritical alignment of public health goals with the ethics theory of utilitarianism, and c) assuming that those working in public health might be able to fully understand the experiences of marginalized populations. It is our view that the trend of public consultation with marginalized persons, the explicit teaching of ethics and philosophy of science in graduate departments of public health, and the increased use of health equity impact assessments might help protect against public health policies and practices that disadvantage marginalized populations.
T he goal of public health is not only to promote and protect the health of, and prevent disease in, populations, but to do so in a manner that promotes social justice. There are several prominent theories of social justice in public health, which argue in favour of giving special attention to the health of marginalized* persons. 1, 2 The grounding of public health in social justice leads some public health practitioners and researchers to devote their energy to directly addressing the needs of marginalized populations, while striving to improve the social determinants of health. For example, research into homelessness and food deserts informs the policies and practices of those who work at shelters and cities that try to address food insecurity.
Still, many in public health do not focus explicitly on addressing the needs of marginalized populations or directly redressing negative social determinants of health in their day-to-day professional activities; however, this is not to say these same practices, programs, and policies cannot significantly impact marginalized persons. In this paper, we briefly argue that there are reasons to believe that, despite the best intentions of those working in public health, policy and programs can inadvertently disadvantage those who are already marginalized, a claim that has been made, but not necessarily explored, elsewhere. [3] [4] [5] The goal of the paper is to begin to explore possible reasons why marginalized persons might be further marginalized by public health policy and programs; we provide two examples for the purposes of illustration (the examples being intentionally controversial, provocative, and subject to much debate). We propose that the reasons some public health policies or practices may perpetuate or worsen, rather than diminish, the struggles of marginalized persons may stem from a) inadequately acknowledging the normative aspects of ostensibly objective data, b) a misunderstanding and an uncritical alignment of public health goals with the ethics theory of utilitarianism, and c) assuming that those working in public health might be able to fully understand the experiences of marginalized populations. In addition, we will provide three recommendations about how one might begin to address these situations where public health policies and practices further disadvantage marginalized populations. We note at the outset that the ideas and terms introduced in this commentary are complex and nuanced (e.g., "social justice", "marginalized", etc.); however, for the purposes of this paper, we provide only skeletal definitions of terms. This commentary is not intended to replace a theoretical analysis and exploration of key terms.
Disadvantaging the Disadvantaged: When Public Health Policies and Practices Negatively Affect Marginalized Populations

Two cases
Case One
Despite evidence suggesting that persons who are homeless are at greater risk of being infected with influenza and suffer greater morbidity than the general population, 6,7 many pandemic influenza plans provide impracticable advice or otherwise fail to address the specific needs of those who are homeless. As merely one example among many, the State Department of Health in Indiana recommended that persons who are homeless should be dissuaded from using shelters during outbreaks and should be treated for influenza on the street by teams of three; 8 however, given the cold winters of Indiana, it seems untenable that persons who use shelters will be able to, or ought to, stay away from them without placing themselves in danger of other perils, such as freezing to death. Moreover, the human resource constraints that will no doubt exist during a pandemic might limit the ability to serve homeless populations on the street. By proposing imprudent or unfeasible interventions that do not adequately account for the contextual considerations of persons who are homeless, such plans may not address this population's unique challenges. Although this example from Indiana may seem extreme, it is important to note that the advice commonly provided to the public to help avoid spreading and contracting the flu (e.g., staying home if you feel sick, avoiding crowds as best as possible, drinking lots of fluids, and washing your hands) may not fit the reality of those who rely on congregate living, such as shelters (especially during the winter months), or who have limited access to water and means to wash their hands.
Case Two
Despite the adverse cardiopulmonary consequences of smoking and second-hand smoking, there exist some neurological and social benefits to smoking for persons with schizophrenia. [9] [10] [11] Still, some mental health centres maintain indoor smoking bans on the basis of reducing the harm associated with second-hand smoke, irrespective of any potential benefits to subpopulations. 12, 13 In the UK case of R v. Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust, 14 the plaintiffs, who were long-term residents of a mental health centre, argued that an indoor smoking ban violated their right to choose to smoke. Upon hearing medical testimony about both the possible positive and negative effects of smoking in persons with schizophrenia, the judges ruled that the smoking ban was legally permissible and, moreover, that the plaintiffs did not have a right to have their smoking habit accommodated. An argument can be (and has been) made that although the health of others must be protected, if there exists a right to better one's own health as he or she sees fit (including through alternative or controversial means), then when that right is curtailed, persons with schizophrenia who choose to smoke ought to be accommodated. 15 Moreover, although there are some preliminary studies that suggest that smoking cessation can be successfully completed with minimal complications in persons with schizophrenia, 16 it is unclear whether providing smoking cessation as an option does away with the right to better one's health through controversial means. The issue with smoking and persons with schizophrenia is not only that refraining from smoking may harm them, but that perhaps, as some studies suggest, there may exist benefits to their smoking. Thus, even seemingly uncontroversial and commonplace public health programs, like those of tobacco cessation, may have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging those who are already disadvantaged.
Why some policies and practices may further disadvantage marginalized populations
Given the grounding of public health in social justice, an ethical argument can be made for the importance of research that seeks to explore when and why some public health policy and practice may further disadvantage marginalized populations; for now, we hypothesize three possible causes to help catalyze research in this area.
First, certain actions may be (and often are) considered as irrefutably and obviously good or bad, which may be based on a misunderstanding or oversimplification of the epistemological role of evidence (especially epidemiological) and its part in supporting public health policy and practice. Bensimon and Upshur, for example, have argued against a purely "objective" notion of evidence, where epidemiological evidence "cannot be divorced from the specific context from which they emerge-a context that is…inevitably historically limited". 17 In other words, evidence in favour or against certain conclusions cannot be separated from preexisting assumptions of what is considered good and bad, i.e., from ethical evaluation. For example, there may exist some benefits of smoking (all things considered) for particular populations in particular contexts that may be eclipsed in current practice by the predominate view that not only is smoking often unhealthy, but also that it is morally bad. 18 Likewise, while avoiding the spread of influenza is an important public health goal, it is not entirely clear that it is more important than particular services that may benefit those most marginalized, such as shelter during cold winter months for persons who are homeless. Goals in public health policy and practice, especially those that we often take for granted and that are supported by epidemiological evidence, ought to be critically evaluated with respect to how they might perpetuate disadvantage among those already disadvantaged.
Second, some public health policy and practice uncritically and unknowingly aligns itself with the ethics theory of utilitarianism, i.e., to act so as to produce the most good for the greatest number of people.* Public health policy often uses metrics, e.g., qualityadjusted life years or disability-adjusted life years, for the purposes of maximizing utility or efficiency at the expense of other normative considerations. Although utilitarianism, utility, and efficiency may be sound, problems arise if they are applied uncritically in public health, such as when an individual is sacrificed for the good of many without any protection of his or her rights or needs. For example, the problem with indoor smoking bans is not the restrictions or the rationales per se, but rather when the rights or needs of the smoker with schizophrenia are not duly considered or accommodated. Protecting others from second-hand smoke is no doubt a good thing, but the potential benefits of smoking for persons with schizophrenia cannot be dismissed easily or outright.
Finally, it may be that those persons charged with creating policy and executing practice believe that they understand the experiences and beliefs of marginalized populations and consider their understanding sufficient with regard to addressing the needs of these populations. Iris Marion Young, a legal philosopher, describes
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e412 REVUE CANADIENNE DE SANTÉ PUBLIQUE • VOL. 104, NO. 5 DISADVANTAGING THE DISADVANTAGED the problem of "reversing positions", which states that, when identifying problem x, individuals y believe they can transcend their social positions and understand and relate to individuals z with regard to problem x. 19 However, it is unclear whether reversing positions is either possible or desirable. There may exist epistemological problems with the very notion of reversing positions, i.e., to do so would require eliminating not only one's personal historical perspective in relation to a given action or inaction, but also transcending one's personal historical perspective in relation to another individual. Also it may not be desirable to do so, since reversing positions may perpetuate social and political power imbalances. Returning to the cases described above, perhaps the reason that there exist so few pandemic plans that adequately address homelessness is that so few people who wrote pandemic plans have experienced homelessness; the recommendations supplied may not accord with the lived reality of persons who are homeless. This pattern may also be at the heart of why smoking is rarely considered from the perspective of persons with schizophrenia; namely, that persons with the power to make policy that regulate indoor smoking are rarely the same individuals who suffer from schizophrenia.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To conclude, we present three recommendations that may begin to address the challenges identified above and whose effectiveness ought to be studied empirically. First, we support the trend in public health for greater consultation, engagement, and dialogue with marginalized populations in both research and practice. Public engagement, although not a panacea, may help guard against Young's objection of reversing positions since it generally supports the idea that different persons will have different but mutually legitimate understandings of a given phenomenon.
Second, there needs to be a greater emphasis on teaching ethics and the philosophy of science in graduate schools or departments of public health. Doing so may begin to provide a way of thinking critically about the arguments that are implicit in policy and practice, including the philosophical assumptions behind epidemiology and biostatistics. This is particularly important when thinking about and questioning what constitutes the good and the right in public health, and may help guard against simplistic applications of ethics theories or principles (whether utilitarian or others).
Finally, health equity impact assessments (HEIA) ought to be considered a viable tool to evaluate the disproportionate impact that proposed public health policies and programs might have on particular populations. HEIAs can be used as an evidence-based tool that assesses whether a proposed policy or program will have an inequitable impact, and which persons or populations might be inequitably affected, and that may even motivate policy makers to think of ways to pre-emptively address such inequities. 20 Impact assessments that have a specific focus on health equity will, at the very least, make explicit how proposed public health initiatives might further disadvantage certain populations.
RÉSUMÉ
La santé publique est intimement liée à la justice sociale, ce qui explique pourquoi la pratique et la recherche sur le terrain visent à améliorer les déterminants sociaux de la santé. Malgré les meilleures intentions des personnes qui travaillent en santé publique toutefois, certaines politiques et pratiques défavorisent encore davantage, sans le vouloir, des populations déjà marginalisées. Dans cet article, nous diagnostiquons les raisons possibles d'un tel phénomène. Nous faisons valoir que les difficultés associées à la marginalisation accrue de certaines populations découlent : a) de la non-reconnaissance des aspects normatifs de données apparemment objectives, b) d'une méconnaissance des objectifs de santé publique et de leur réglage sans discernement sur la théorie éthique de l'utilitarisme et c) de l'hypothèse selon laquelle les personnes qui travaillent en santé publique pourraient être capables de comprendre pleinement les expériences de populations marginalisées. Nous considérons que la tendance à la consultation publique des personnes marginalisées, l'enseignement explicite de l'éthique et de la philosophie de la science dans les départements d'études supérieures en santé publique et l'utilisation accrue des évaluations de l'impact sur l'équité en matière de santé pourraient être des mesures de protection contre les politiques et les pratiques sanitaires qui défavorisent les populations marginalisées.
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